La transformación en la política comercial de Estados Unidos ha experimentado cambios dramáticos a lo largo de las últimas ocho décadas: desde el proteccionismo durante el periodo de entreguerras, pasando por la liberalización en la posguerra, hasta un retorno reciente a tendencias proteccionistas. Durante la Gran Depresión, el presidente estadounidense Herbert Hoover firmó la Ley Arancelaria Smoot-Hawley de 1930, aumentando los aranceles medios de importación en aproximadamente un 20% en un intento de proteger a las industrias nacionales. Sin embargo, la ley provocó aranceles de represalia por parte de los principales socios comerciales, perturbando gravemente el comercio global y exacerbando la recesión económica mundial. Por el contrario, la era posterior a la Segunda Guerra Mundial presenció una transformación fundamental en la política comercial de Estados Unidos. Con gran parte de Europa y Asia en ruinas, Estados Unidos emergió como la potencia económica dominante y abanderó una agenda comercial liberal. Encabezó la creación de instituciones multilaterales como el Acuerdo General sobre Aranceles Aduaneros y Comercio (GATT) y, posteriormente, la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC) para promover mercados abiertos y reducir las barreras comerciales. La Modificación en la Política Comercial de los Estados Unidos demostró ser altamente beneficiosa para los Estados Unidos; a pesar de representar solo el 4% de la población mundial, los Estados Unidos produjeron más de la mitad de los bienes manufacturados del mundo durante este período (Siddiqui, 2016). La disolución de la Unión Soviética en 1991 fortaleció aún más el liderazgo económico de los Estados Unidos y profundizó su compromiso con la globalización, la movilidad de capital y la integración de mercados. Sin embargo, en años recientes ha habido un resurgimiento en los Estados Unidos de un sentimiento proteccionista en respuesta al aumento de los déficits comerciales, la declinación industrial y la creciente desigualdad de ingresos. El nacionalismo económico actual se desarrolla en un entorno internacional muy diferente, ya que el Sur Global, especialmente muchas naciones del Este y Sudeste Asiático, han logrado una rápida industrialización, con China emergiendo como una potencia tecnológica y manufacturera clave. Los Estados Unidos fueron fundamentales en iniciar la fase contemporánea de la globalización, impulsada en gran medida por el objetivo de maximizar la rentabilidad de las corporaciones multinacionales. El aumento de los costos laborales en casa llevó a las empresas a trasladar la producción a países de salarios bajos, especialmente a China, para mejorar los retornos de inversión, mantener bajos los costos de producción y contener la inflación. Sin embargo, la externalización también trajo desafíos internos: contribuyó a la pérdida de empleos en los Estados Unidos y erosionó el poder de negociación de los sindicatos laborales (Siddiqui, 2012). En las últimas décadas, la globalización impulsada por los Estados Unidos, facilitada por flujos de capital liberalizados y acuerdos comerciales, no solo ha aumentado los volúmenes comerciales globales, sino que también ha transformado la organización de la producción. Mientras que antes los bienes eran fabricados enteramente dentro de un solo país, la producción moderna se caracteriza por una fragmentación geográfica e interdependencia transfronteriza. Esta evolución ha elevado la importancia estratégica de la gestión de la cadena de suministro (SCM), que coordina y optimiza el flujo de materiales, finanzas e información desde materias primas hasta productos terminados. Una SCM efectiva puede impulsar mejoras en la eficiencia, reducción de costos y satisfacción del cliente, proporcionando a las empresas una ventaja competitiva crucial en un mercado global cada vez más interconectado. A pesar de la sofisticación de las cadenas de suministro actuales, la reciente imposición de aranceles por parte del presidente Donald Trump a las importaciones de los Estados Unidos (ver Figura 1) subraya un enfoque político destinado a corregir desequilibrios comerciales y generar ingresos federales. Sin embargo, tales medidas pasan por alto el potencial de acciones retaliatorias por parte de socios comerciales clave, lo que corre el riesgo de una mayor interrupción de los sistemas comerciales globales y de socavar los beneficios económicos previstos (The Guardian, 2025b). II. Los Límites y Complejidades del Renacimiento Industrial basado en Aranceles En lugar de participar en una competencia económica directa con China, Estados Unidos parece estar adoptando una estrategia para interrumpir el ascenso económico de China. Esta estrategia incluye aranceles punitivos, restricciones al acceso chino a tecnologías avanzadas y una postura militar asertiva destinada a rodear a China. Al mismo tiempo, Estados Unidos ha proporcionado tanto apoyo retórico como material a grupos disidentes entre las minorías de China. Colectivamente, estas medidas señalan un objetivo estratégico más amplio: evitar que China surja como un rival serio para la hegemonía global de Estados Unidos (Siddiqui, 2018a). La reciente guerra comercial liderada por Estados Unidos es emblemática de este enfoque. En lugar de constituir una disputa comercial convencional, está diseñada para desestabilizar la economía global, revertir el impulso de la globalización e introducir presiones inflacionarias e incertidumbre en los mercados internacionales. Sin embargo, tal política conlleva riesgos significativos y consecuencias no deseadas, no solo para China, sino también para la economía global y para Estados Unidos mismo. Los aranceles pueden generar beneficios a corto plazo al proteger a las industrias nacionales de la competencia extranjera, pero esta protección a menudo tiene un costo. Cuando las empresas están aisladas de las presiones competitivas, pueden tener menos incentivos para innovar, mejorar la eficiencia o diversificar las ofertas al consumidor, lo que finalmente socava la productividad a largo plazo y el dinamismo económico. Si bien muchas naciones, incluidos los Estados Unidos, han utilizado históricamente aranceles para fomentar industrias incipientes, tales estrategias dependen de una implementación cuidadosa y tienen un alcance limitado (Siddiqui, 2018b). El giro actual de Estados Unidos hacia el proteccionismo representa una marcada ruptura con su compromiso de larga data con el libre comercio, un sistema que una vez ayudó a establecer y promover. Hoy, sin embargo, Estados Unidos critica este sistema como inherentemente injusto. Este cambio afecta negativamente a los países en desarrollo, que se ven obligados a comprar bienes estadounidenses a precios más altos, profundizando así las cargas de deuda y exacerbando las dificultades económicas en el Sur Global. Históricamente, la manufactura fue el pilar de la economía de los Estados Unidos, generando ganancias sustanciales durante la década de 1950 (Siddiqui, 1995). Sin embargo, para la década de 1980, el aumento de los costos laborales y la disminución de la rentabilidad industrial impulsaron un cambio hacia sectores de alto valor como la banca, las finanzas, la tecnología de la información y los servicios digitales. Esta transformación económica ha persistido hasta el presente; en 2024, los Estados Unidos exportaron más de US$1 billón en servicios, más que cualquier otro país, subrayando su dominio en industrias de alto valor. Fuente: The Guardian (2025b). El Cambio en la Política Comercial de Estados Unidos ha generado décadas de deslocalización que no solo han desplazado industrias y mano de obra calificada, sino que también han socavado el emprendimiento nacional, los ecosistemas de fabricación y la expertise técnica. Como se muestra en la Figura 2, la participación de la manufactura global atribuible a Estados Unidos ha disminuido notablemente con el tiempo. En contraste, la participación de China ha aumentado, pasando de niveles insignificantes en 1990 a más del 30% en 2024, convirtiéndose en el mayor fabricante del mundo. Japón y Alemania han experimentado declives graduales en sus participaciones de manufactura en el mismo período, mientras que Corea del Sur ha visto un crecimiento modesto. Además, en las últimas décadas, las corporaciones estadounidenses han priorizado cada vez más el valor para los accionistas a corto plazo sobre la productividad y la innovación a largo plazo. En los últimos treinta años, muchas empresas estadounidenses han dirigido la mayoría de sus beneficios hacia pagos de dividendos y recompras de acciones, a menudo a expensas de la reinversión de capital, la investigación y el desarrollo, y la capacitación de la fuerza laboral. Este cortoplacismo ha contribuido a debilitar la competitividad industrial y a disminuir la capacidad de liderazgo tecnológico. III. Precedentes Históricos del Proteccionismo y la Política Industrial Históricamente, prácticamente todos los países ahora desarrollados emplearon políticas proteccionistas durante sus primeras etapas de industrialización. En Estados Unidos, por ejemplo, Alexander Hamilton abogó por el uso de aranceles a principios del siglo XIX para promover las industrias nacionales. Estrategias similares se implementaron antes en Gran Bretaña y luego se adoptaron en Alemania y Japón, como componentes integrales de agendas más amplias de desarrollo industrial. La industrialización efectiva típicamente requiere más que simplemente proteger sectores seleccionados de la competencia extranjera. También exige un amplio apoyo político, incluidas inversiones en educación y desarrollo de habilidades, la cultivación de una fuerza laboral capacitada, acceso a crédito asequible, tasas de interés favorables y una planificación industrial coordinada. Construir una base industrial sólida y competitiva requiere un compromiso estratégico a largo plazo: las inversiones esporádicas en fábricas o intervenciones políticas aisladas son insuficientes para generar un crecimiento sostenido y avances tecnológicos. Además, la imposición de aranceles no conduce automáticamente a un renacimiento industrial. La reubicación de operaciones de manufactura es costosa, lleva tiempo y a menudo es inviable a menos que las empresas estén seguras de que dichos aranceles se mantendrán a largo plazo. Si se perciben como temporales o políticamente inestables, los regímenes arancelarios pueden desalentar a las empresas a relocalizar la producción. Medidas proteccionistas mal concebidas también pueden llevar a costos operativos más altos y a una menor competitividad global. A nivel macroeconómico, los aranceles a menudo resultan en precios de consumo elevados, contribuyendo a presiones inflacionarias. Cuando se combinan con la creciente desigualdad y salarios estancados, esto puede suprimir la demanda agregada y, en casos graves, desencadenar desaceleraciones económicas o recesiones. El discurso económico contemporáneo sigue estando fuertemente dominado por paradigmas neoclásicos que priorizan la eficiencia del mercado mientras descuidan la desigualdad estructural. Esta ortodoxia intelectual guarda similitud con el papel desempeñado por el clero católico en la Edad Media, cuando los desastres naturales a menudo se atribuían a los fracasos morales de los pobres, absolviendo así a las élites y gobernantes de responsabilidad. De manera similar, las narrativas económicas modernas tienden a individualizar la pobreza y el subdesarrollo, a menudo enmarcándolos como consecuencias de fallos personales en lugar de injusticias sistémicas. Esta tendencia oscurece las ventajas estructurales disfrutadas por las élites económicas e obstaculiza el compromiso crítico con la concentración de riqueza, la desigualdad y el statu quo (Siddiqui, 1989). A pesar de la hambruna masiva, se siguieron exportando cantidades sustanciales de alimentos, como trigo y ganado, desde Irlanda, principalmente a Inglaterra. Históricamente, las consecuencias del libre comercio en contextos coloniales han sido devastadoras. Uno de los ejemplos más trágicos es la Hambruna Irlandesa de 1846-1848, precipitada por una plaga de papas que diezmó el cultivo de alimentos básicos. La crisis humanitaria se vio exacerbada por varios factores estructurales, incluida la sobredependencia en un solo cultivo, un sistema profundamente explotador de arrendamiento de tierras y los insuficientes esfuerzos de ayuda de la administración colonial británica. A pesar de la hambruna masiva, se siguieron exportando cantidades sustanciales de alimentos, como trigo y ganado, desde Irlanda, principalmente a Inglaterra. Esta paradoja de exportar alimentos en medio de una hambruna generalizada intensificó el sufrimiento, cobrando finalmente más de un millón de vidas y obligando a otro millón a emigrar, principalmente a América del Norte y Australia. Charles Edward Trevelyan, entonces Secretario del Tesoro Británico, infamemente comentó que «el juicio de Dios envió la calamidad para enseñarle una lección a los irlandeses… la plaga es un mecanismo efectivo para controlar la población». Sus comentarios encapsularon una mentalidad colonial más amplia que deshumanizaba a las poblaciones colonizadas y racionalizaba la inacción estatal. Un patrón similar se desarrolló décadas antes durante la Hambruna de Bengala de 1770 bajo el dominio de la Compañía Británica de las Indias Orientales. Aproximadamente un tercio de la población de Bengala, más de 10 millones de personas, perecieron mientras las autoridades coloniales no proporcionaban ayuda significativa. En ambos casos, los funcionarios británicos invocaron teorías malthusianas para justificar la negligencia, enmarcando la muerte masiva como una corrección natural en lugar de reconocer las causas estructurales y los fallos administrativos que exacerbaron los desastres (Siddiqui, 2020c). IV. Tamaño Económico, Trayectorias de Crecimiento y Flujos Comerciales Hasta enero de 2025, Estados Unidos cuenta con un Producto Interno Bruto (PIB) de aproximadamente US$25.5 billones, en comparación con los US$18 billones de China. En términos per cápita, Estados Unidos lidera con un ingreso de US$82,800, mientras que el ingreso per cápita de China es de aproximadamente US$12,600. Mirando hacia el futuro, las previsiones para 2025 esperan que el PIB de Estados Unidos crezca a una tasa anual de aproximadamente 2.4%, mientras que se anticipa que la economía de China se expanda en un 4.8%. Colectivamente, estos dos gigantes económicos representan casi un tercio del comercio mundial, destacando sus roles centrales en el orden económico internacional. El comercio internacional expresado como un porcentaje del PIB (suma de exportaciones e importaciones de bienes y servicios, dividido por el producto interno bruto). El comercio ha aumentado notablemente en las últimas décadas, como se ilustra en la Figura 3. Sin embargo, desde el inicio de la crisis financiera global en 2008, ha habido una notable disminución en la participación del comercio en relación con el PIB, especialmente en China. En respuesta a la crisis, China adoptó una estrategia económica centrada en el mercado interno, invirtiendo fuertemente en infraestructura y servicios domésticos para estimular los mercados internos y aumentar el empleo (Banco Mundial, 2025; Dadush, 2022). El comercio entre Estados Unidos y China sigue siendo sustancial. En 2024, el comercio bilateral totalizó US$582.4 mil millones. Las exportaciones de Estados Unidos a China alcanzaron los US$143.5 mil millones, mientras que las importaciones desde China aumentaron a US$438.9 mil millones, lo que resultó en un déficit comercial de EE. UU. de US$295.4 mil millones. En comparación, en 2023, las exportaciones de EE. UU. a China ascendieron a US$147.7 mil millones, con importaciones por un total de US$426.8 mil millones, generando un déficit comercial de US$279.1 mil millones (ver Figura 4). Estas cifras subrayan el persistente desequilibrio entre las exportaciones e importaciones de EE. UU. con China. La estructura del comercio entre las dos naciones refleja sus perfiles económicos distintos. En 2024, las exportaciones de EE. UU. a China estaban dominadas principalmente por productos agrícolas, como la soja, y commodities energéticos como el petróleo crudo y el gas natural. Por el contrario, las importaciones de EE. UU. desde China se centraron en bienes manufacturados, incluidos equipos de radiodifusión, computadoras y piezas de máquinas de oficina. Esta composición de productos destaca las diferentes ventajas competitivas: mientras que EE. UU. sobresale en los sectores agrícola y energético de alto valor, China mantiene su fortaleza en la fabricación de productos electrónicos y otros bienes de consumo. En 2024, la estrategia comercial de China ha evolucionado, con la nación diversificando sus lazos económicos y dependiendo cada vez más de socios del Sur Global. Contrario a años anteriores cuando Estados Unidos era el mayor socio comercial de China, datos recientes indican que los países del Este Asiático dominan ahora las relaciones comerciales de China (ver Figuras 5a y 5b). Además, China ha ampliado su red comercial al expandir la cooperación económica con Rusia y otras naciones BRICS, lo que ha llevado a una cartera de exportaciones que ahora favorece a los mercados del Sur Global sobre los del Norte Global (Siddiqui, 2024c). Bajo los auspicios de la Iniciativa del Cinturón y Ruta de la Seda (BRI), China ha buscado aumentar su capacidad exportadora a nivel mundial. Como resultado, en 2024, el 47% de las exportaciones de China estaban dirigidas a mercados fuera de EE. UU. (ver Figura 6). En marcado contraste, solo el 13% de las exportaciones totales de China estaban destinadas al mercado estadounidense en 2024, frente al 23% en 2018. A pesar de esta diversificación, ciertas categorías de productos, especialmente la electrónica y los materiales crudos cruciales para la fabricación, siguen dependiendo en gran medida del acceso al mercado estadounidense. Esta estrategia dual de diversificación combinada con dependencia selectiva subraya los esfuerzos de China por reequilibrar sus relaciones comerciales internacionales mientras mantiene fortalezas competitivas en sectores clave (Siddiqui, 2021). (2025) «El cambio en la política comercial de EE. UU.» El Mundo Financiero, mayo. El cambio en la política comercial de EE. UU. El cambio en la política comercial de Estados Unidos
By Dr. Kalim Siddiqui
In an era increasingly shaped by trade wars and shifting geopolitical priorities, Kalim Siddiqui explores the United States’ departure from its longstanding commitment to free trade. The article offers a critical analysis of how the world’s leading economy has turned to tariffs, unilateralism, and protectionist measures to reassert its global economic influence.
I. Introduction
President Donald Trump’s imposition of sweeping tariffs—widely regarded as the most significant protectionist measures in over a century—marked a dramatic shift in United States (US) trade policy. Trump called it as a “Liberation Day,” the ensuing trade war disrupted global markets, erasing an estimated US$6.6 trillion in value within just 48 hours worldwide. A large portion of that was from US markets, but it’s not exclusive to the US. It represents a broader global market value loss tied to fears about disrupted trade, uncertainty, and slowed growth due to the trade war. In swift retaliation, China imposed reciprocal tariffs and blacklisted American firms, and tightened export controls on rare earth minerals essential to high-tech industries.
The US is effectively turning its back on a trading system that has long served it well. For nearly eighty years, the US has greatly benefited from trade liberalization. While it has consistently run a trade deficit in goods, but it maintains a surplus in services—an area in which it is the world’s leading exporter.
By attempting to reduce the US trade deficit through broad tariffs—primarily targeting China and the European Union (EU)—Trump inadvertently strengthened the dollar by attracting global capital inflows.
Trump’s tariff strategy was unlikely to succeed for several reasons. Most importantly, his effort to “stop China” in key sectors such as technology failed to account for the complexities of highly integrated global supply chains. His belief that the US should maintain a bilateral trade balance with every country reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of global economics (Siddiqui, 2025). In today’s interconnected world, trade imbalances naturally arise from comparative advantage and specialization. By attempting to reduce the US trade deficit through broad tariffs—primarily targeting China and the European Union (EU)—Trump inadvertently strengthened the dollar by attracting global capital inflows. This, in turn, will make the US exports less competitive on the global stage (The Guardian (2025a).
Moreover, true structural reform would require challenging the privileged status of the US dollar as the world’s primary reserve currency—a move that would undermine the US financial hegemony (Siddiqui, 2024a). One probable objective of these tariffs was to force China and the EU into a currency revaluation similar to the 1985 Plaza Accord. That agreement led to a significant decline in Japanese exports and contributed to decades of economic stagnation. Yet, unlike 1980s Japan—a US ally with limited geopolitical leverage—China is neither defeated nor dependent. It is an ascendant power with growing influence. The contrast is underscored by the enduring US military presence in Okinawa, where over 53,000 American troops remain stationed, highlighting the historical asymmetry between the two cases.
Rather than adapting to an increasingly multipolar global order, the US appears committed to preserving its hegemonic status. In pursuit of this objective, it has employed a combination of strategic, economic, and diplomatic tools aimed at containing the rise of potential rivals—chiefly China—underscoring the geopolitical motivations behind its recent shift in trade policy (Siddiqui, 2020a).
There are indications that the US seeks to replicate the outcome it achieved with the Soviet Union: internal collapse driven by economic and systemic pressure. While the Soviet Union achieved significant technological and industrial advancements between the 1950s and 1970s, it ultimately failed to increase the production of consumer goods and improve living standards, contributing to its eventual disintegration in 1990. However, the analogy with China is limited. Unlike the Soviet Union, China has actively expanded its trade and investment ties, particularly within East Asia. Since its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, economic integration between China and its regional neighbours has deepened significantly, creating a resilient and dynamic network that distinguishes China’s position from that of the Soviet Union (Siddiqui, 2024b).
China is unlikely to agree to a significant revaluation of the renminbi (yuan) merely to address the US trade deficit. Trump’s twin objectives—reducing the trade deficit while preserving dollar hegemony—are, in fact, mutually exclusive. Protectionist measures alone are insufficient to correct structural imbalances in the economy. Without a broader overhaul of the international monetary and trading system, such policies are more likely to accelerate a shift away from US economic primacy than reinforce it (Siddiqui, 2020b).
Over the past eight decades, the trajectory of US trade policy has undergone dramatic shifts: from protectionism during the interwar period, to liberalization in the postwar era, and more recently, a return to protectionist tendencies. During the Great Depression, the US President Herbert Hoover signed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, raising average import duties by approximately 20% in an attempt to shield domestic industries. However, the act provoked retaliatory tariffs from major trading partners, severely disrupting global commerce and exacerbating the global economic downturn.
In contrast, the post–World War II era witnessed a fundamental transformation in US trade policy. With much of Europe and Asia in ruins, the US emerged as the dominant economic power and championed a liberal trade agenda. It spearheaded the creation of multilateral institutions like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and, later, the WTO to promote open markets and lower trade barriers. The US benefited greatly from trade liberalization, producing more than half of the world’s manufactured goods despite comprising only 4% of the global population. However, recent protectionist sentiment has emerged in response to trade deficits, industrial decline, and income inequality. The US played a key role in driving globalization, offshoring production to low-wage countries like China to enhance profitability. This shift led to job losses and weakened labor unions in the US.
While globalization has expanded trade volumes and transformed production organization, recent US tariffs signal a shift towards protectionism, risking global trade disruption. The US appears to be aiming to disrupt China’s economic rise through punitive measures and military posturing. However, such tactics may have unintended consequences for the global economy and the US itself.
While tariffs can protect domestic industries in the short term, they may hinder innovation and productivity in the long run. The US’s turn towards protectionism contrasts sharply with its historical support for free trade. This shift negatively impacts developing countries, increasing debt burdens and economic hardship.
The decline of US manufacturing, which once dominated the economy, has shifted towards high-value industries like services. Only 9% of the US workforce is now in manufacturing, down from 39% in 1980, reflecting a broader economic transformation. The reliance on international supply chains for critical components highlights the erosion of US industrial capacity and supply chain sovereignty. Decades of outsourcing have not only led to the displacement of industries and skilled labor, but have also weakened domestic entrepreneurship, manufacturing ecosystems, and technical expertise.
The share of global manufacturing attributed to the US has significantly decreased over time, while China has emerged as the world’s largest manufacturer. Japan and Germany have seen declines in their manufacturing shares, while South Korea has experienced modest growth.
In recent years, US corporations have prioritized short-term shareholder value over long-term productivity and innovation, leading to a weakening of industrial competitiveness and technological leadership.
Historically, protectionist policies have been crucial for the industrial development of now-developed countries. Effective industrialization requires comprehensive policy support, including investments in education, skill development, and access to credit.
While tariffs can be used to promote domestic industries, poorly conceived protectionist measures can lead to increased operational costs, reduced global competitiveness, and inflationary pressures.
Contemporary economic discourse often neglects structural inequality, similar to how the Catholic clergy in the Middle Ages blamed natural disasters on the poor, absolving elites of responsibility.
The consequences of free trade in colonial contexts have been devastating, as seen in the Irish Famine of 1846-1848, where food continued to be exported despite mass starvation, intensifying the crisis.
The US and China play central roles in global trade, with their economies accounting for nearly one-third of global trade. Trade as a percentage of GDP has increased over the past few decades, but has declined since the 2008 global financial crisis. In response to the crisis, China shifted its economic strategy inward, focusing on investing in domestic infrastructure and services to stimulate internal markets and boost employment (World Bank, 2025; Dadush, 2022). This move aimed to reduce their reliance on external trade and bolster their domestic economy.
Trade between the US and China remained significant in 2024, with bilateral trade totaling US$582.4 billion. However, the US trade deficit with China continued to widen, highlighting the persistent imbalance in trade relations. The US primarily exported agricultural products and energy commodities to China, while China’s exports to the US were dominated by manufactured goods.
China’s trade network evolved in 2024, with a shift towards diversifying economic ties with partners from the Global South. East Asian countries now dominate China’s trading relationships, and the Belt and Road Initiative has helped China expand its export capacity globally. While China has diversified its export destinations, certain product categories remain reliant on access to the US market.
The interdependence of the US and China extends beyond trade, with critical sectors like pharmaceuticals and rare earth materials heavily intertwined in supply chains. China’s role in supplying vital ingredients for pharmaceuticals and rare earth materials to the US underscores the vulnerabilities in the supply chain. Any disruptions in these supplies could have severe consequences for both countries.
Overall, China’s evolving trade network and strategic economic interdependencies with the US highlight the complexities and vulnerabilities present in their trade relations. Both countries must navigate these challenges to ensure a stable and mutually beneficial economic partnership. (2025) «The Changing Landscape of Global Trade: Economic and Geopolitical Shifts» by Dr. Kalim Siddiqui discusses the breakdown in economic and geopolitical orders, particularly between the US and China. Since China joined the WTO in 2001, its exports to the US have exceeded its imports, leading to a widening trade gap. The imposition of tariffs by the US in an attempt to reverse this trend has led China to diversify its trade towards other emerging economies. This shift has implications for consumer prices, economic growth, and the possibility of a recession in the US. Additionally, China’s investments in US assets, particularly Treasury bonds, have helped finance US deficits and support the dollar. However, China has been reducing its holdings in recent years in favor of initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative. The article concludes by emphasizing the need for policymakers to consider economic decoupling from an overreliance on the US market and to strengthen trade cooperation among major Global South economies to promote a more resilient global trading system.
Por el Dr. Kalim Siddiqui
En una era cada vez más moldeada por guerras comerciales y cambios en las prioridades geopolíticas, Kalim Siddiqui explora la salida de los Estados Unidos de su compromiso de larga data con el libre comercio. El artículo ofrece un análisis crítico de cómo la economía líder mundial ha recurrido a aranceles, unilateralismo y medidas proteccionistas para reafirmar su influencia económica global.
I. Introducción
La imposición de aranceles generalizados por parte del presidente Donald Trump, ampliamente considerados como las medidas proteccionistas más significativas en más de un siglo, marcó un cambio dramático en la política comercial de los Estados Unidos (EE. UU.). Trump lo llamó «Día de la Liberación», la subsiguiente guerra comercial perturbó los mercados globales, borrando un estimado de US$6.6 billones en valor en solo 48 horas en todo el mundo. Una gran parte de eso provino de los mercados estadounidenses, pero no es exclusivo de EE. UU. Representa una pérdida de valor del mercado global más amplia relacionada con los temores sobre el comercio interrumpido, la incertidumbre y el crecimiento ralentizado debido a la guerra comercial. En rápida represalia, China impuso aranceles recíprocos y puso en lista negra a empresas estadounidenses, y reforzó los controles de exportación sobre minerales de tierras raras esenciales para las industrias de alta tecnología.
Los Estados Unidos están dando la espalda efectivamente a un sistema comercial que durante mucho tiempo le ha servido bien. Durante casi ochenta años, los EE. UU. se han beneficiado enormemente de la liberalización del comercio. Si bien ha mantenido consistentemente un déficit comercial en bienes, mantiene un superávit en servicios, un área en la que es el principal exportador mundial.
Al intentar reducir el déficit comercial de los EE. UU. a través de aranceles amplios, principalmente dirigidos a China y la Unión Europea (UE), Trump fortuitamente fortaleció el dólar al atraer flujos de capital globales.
La estrategia arancelaria de Trump probablemente no tendría éxito por varias razones. Lo más importante, su esfuerzo por «detener a China» en sectores clave como la tecnología no tuvo en cuenta las complejidades de las cadenas de suministro globales altamente integradas. Su creencia de que los EE. UU. deberían mantener un equilibrio comercial bilateral con cada país revela un malentendido fundamental de la economía global (Siddiqui, 2025). En el mundo interconectado de hoy, los desequilibrios comerciales surgen naturalmente de la ventaja comparativa y la especialización. Al intentar reducir el déficit comercial de los EE. UU. a través de aranceles amplios, principalmente dirigidos a China y la Unión Europea (UE), Trump fortuitamente fortaleció el dólar al atraer flujos de capital globales. Esto, a su vez, hará que las exportaciones de los EE. UU. sean menos competitivas a nivel mundial (The Guardian, 2025a).
Además, una verdadera reforma estructural requeriría desafiar el estatus privilegiado del dólar estadounidense como la principal moneda de reserva mundial, una medida que socavaría la hegemonía financiera de los EE. UU. (Siddiqui, 2024a). Uno de los objetivos probables de estos aranceles era forzar a China y la UE a una revaluación de la moneda similar al Acuerdo Plaza de 1985. Ese acuerdo llevó a una disminución significativa de las exportaciones japonesas y contribuyó a décadas de estancamiento económico. Sin embargo, a diferencia del Japón de los años 80, un aliado de EE. UU. con una influencia geopolítica limitada, China no está ni derrotada ni dependiente. Es una potencia ascendente con creciente influencia. La diferencia se destaca por la presencia militar estadounidense duradera en Okinawa, donde más de 53,000 tropas estadounidenses permanecen estacionadas, resaltando la asimetría histórica entre los dos casos.
En lugar de adaptarse a un orden global cada vez más multipolar, los EE. UU. parecen estar comprometidos a preservar su estatus hegemónico. En la búsqueda de este objetivo, ha empleado una combinación de herramientas estratégicas, económicas y diplomáticas dirigidas a contener el ascenso de posibles rivales, principalmente China, subrayando las motivaciones geopolíticas detrás de su reciente cambio en la política comercial (Siddiqui, 2020a).
Existen indicios de que los EE. UU. buscan replicar el resultado que lograron con la Unión Soviética: un colapso interno impulsado por presiones económicas y sistémicas. Si bien la Unión Soviética logró avances tecnológicos e industriales significativos entre la década de 1950 y 1970, finalmente no logró aumentar la producción de bienes de consumo y mejorar los niveles de vida, lo que contribuyó a su desintegración en 1990. Sin embargo, la analogía con China es limitada. A diferencia de la Unión Soviética, China ha expandido activamente sus lazos comerciales e de inversión, particularmente dentro de Asia Oriental. Desde su adhesión a la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC) en 2001, la integración económica entre China y sus vecinos regionales se ha profundizado significativamente, creando una red resiliente y dinámica que distingue la posición de China de la de la Unión Soviética (Siddiqui, 2024b).
Es poco probable que China acepte una revaluación significativa del renminbi (yuan) simplemente para abordar el déficit comercial de EE. UU. Los objetivos gemelos de Trump, reducir el déficit comercial y preservar la hegemonía del dólar, son, de hecho, mutuamente excluyentes. Las medidas proteccionistas por sí solas no son suficientes para corregir desequilibrios estructurales en la economía. Sin una reforma más amplia del sistema monetario y comercial internacional, es más probable que estas políticas aceleren un alejamiento de la primacía económica de EE. UU. que la refuercen (Siddiqui, 2020b).
Durante las últimas ocho décadas, la trayectoria de la política comercial de EE. UU. ha experimentado cambios dramáticos: desde el proteccionismo durante el período de entreguerras, hasta la liberalización en la era de posguerra, y más recientemente, un retorno a tendencias proteccionistas. Durante la Gran Depresión, el presidente de EE. UU. Herbert Hoover firmó la Ley Arancelaria Smoot-Hawley de 1930, aumentando los aranceles de importación promedio en aproximadamente un 20% en un intento de proteger a las industrias nacionales.
However, the retaliatory tariffs from major trading partners in response to this act disrupted global commerce and worsened the global economic downturn.
In contrast, the post–World War II era saw a shift in US trade policy towards promoting open markets and lowering trade barriers. The US championed a liberal trade agenda, leading to the creation of institutions like GATT and the WTO. This period of trade liberalization was highly beneficial for the US, as it emerged as the dominant economic power and produced more than half of the world’s manufactured goods.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 further solidified US economic leadership and commitment to globalization. However, recent years have seen a resurgence of protectionist sentiment in the US, driven by concerns over trade deficits, industrial decline, and income inequality. This shift comes at a time when many developing countries, especially in East and Southeast Asia, have rapidly industrialized, with China becoming a key player in technology and manufacturing.
The US played a significant role in driving globalization, aiming to maximize multinational corporations’ profits by offshoring production to low-wage countries like China. While this strategy has led to efficiency gains and cost reduction, it has also resulted in job losses domestically and weakened labor unions.
Despite the benefits of globalization and supply chain management, recent US tariffs imposed by President Donald Trump risk disrupting global trade systems and undermining economic benefits. This protectionist approach overlooks the potential for retaliatory actions from trading partners.
The current US strategy towards China involves punitive tariffs, restrictions on technology access, and military posturing to prevent China from becoming a global rival. However, this approach poses risks and unintended consequences for the global economy.
While tariffs may offer short-term protection to domestic industries, they can stifle innovation and long-term productivity. The US’ shift towards protectionism marks a departure from its historical commitment to free trade, impacting developing countries and deepening economic hardships.
Structural changes in the US economy have led to a decline in manufacturing employment and GDP contribution. Manufacturing now accounts for just 10.2% of US GDP, down from 39% in 1980, highlighting the shift towards high-value sectors like finance and technology. While manufacturing remains an important part of the economy, its significance has decreased compared to sectors like services, healthcare, education, and finance. The shift away from manufacturing has not only affected employment and output but has also impacted industrial capacity and supply chain sovereignty. The production of complex electronics like the iPhone, for example, relies on components sourced from international supply chains, rather than being manufactured within the US. This trend of offshoring has not only displaced industries and skilled labor but has also weakened domestic entrepreneurship and technical expertise.
The decline in the US manufacturing sector is evident when comparing global manufacturing shares over time. While the US share has decreased, China has become the world’s largest manufacturer, with Japan, Germany, and South Korea experiencing varying levels of change in their manufacturing shares. Additionally, US corporations have prioritized short-term shareholder value over long-term productivity and innovation, leading to a weakening of industrial competitiveness and technological leadership.
Historically, protectionist policies have been essential for the industrialization of now-developed countries. Tariffs and other strategies have been used to promote domestic industries, along with investments in education, labor force development, and industrial planning. However, poorly implemented protectionist measures can lead to higher costs, reduced competitiveness, and other negative consequences. The current economic discourse often overlooks structural inequality, similar to how poverty and underdevelopment were individualized in the past, obscuring systemic injustices.
The consequences of free trade in colonial contexts have been devastating, as seen in events like the Irish Famine and the Bengal Famine, where food exports continued despite widespread starvation. Colonial mindsets and neglectful actions exacerbated these crises, leading to mass deaths and forced emigration. Despite these historical lessons, the US and China continue to play significant roles in global trade, with trade as a percentage of GDP increasing over the years, though showing a slight decline since the global financial crisis. China has responded to the crisis by adopting an inward-focused economic strategy, investing heavily in domestic infrastructure and services to stimulate internal markets and boost employment (World Bank, 2025; Dadush, 2022). This shift in strategy has led to a significant transformation in China’s trade relationships and economic diversification.
Trade between the US and China remains significant, with bilateral trade reaching US$582.4 billion in 2024. However, China has diversified its trade network and now relies more on partners from the Global South, with East Asian countries dominating its trading relationships. Under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has expanded its export capacity globally, with 47% of its exports directed to markets outside of the US in 2024.
Despite this diversification, certain product categories like electronics and raw materials crucial for manufacturing remain heavily reliant on access to the US market. The US pharmaceutical industry, for example, depends on China for vital active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs), and China is also a key supplier of rare earth materials to the US.
As China continues to strengthen its domestic production and diversify its import partners, the interdependencies and vulnerabilities in the global supply chain become more pronounced. The US, in particular, faces risks of supply chain disruptions in critical sectors like pharmaceuticals and rare earth materials due to its reliance on Chinese imports. The economic and geopolitical orders are currently undergoing a simultaneous breakdown. The US has been exporting less to China than it imports since China joined the WTO in 2001, with China becoming known as the ‘world’s factory’ for its exports of electronics and machinery to the US market. President Trump’s response to this trend has been to impose tariffs on Chinese imports. However, China has been diversifying its trade away from the US towards other emerging economies, reducing its dependence on the US market. This shift in trade dynamics post-2001 has led to concerns about higher consumer prices, slower economic growth, and the possibility of a recession in the US. In 2024, China only exported 13% of its goods to the US, down from 23% in 2018.
China has historically reinvested its export surpluses into US assets, particularly Treasury bonds, which have helped finance US fiscal deficits and support the dollar. However, China has been reducing its holdings of US Treasurys in recent years, reallocating funds towards projects like the Belt and Road Initiative. The US now faces the challenge of addressing its trade deficit with China, which accelerated after 2001.
Efforts by the US to hinder China’s technological advancement have not been successful, with China emerging as a global leader in critical technologies by 2025. Globalization has led to integrated supply chains that rely on cost-effective international production, making it difficult to recreate complete domestic supply chains. US tariffs risk disrupting these networks and could result in higher costs and inefficiencies.
Instead of resorting to protectionism, policymakers should consider economic decoupling from an overreliance on the US market and strengthening trade cooperation with major Global South economies. This approach can help mitigate the disruptions caused by tariffs and promote a more resilient and equitable global trading system. Dr. Kalim Siddiqui explores the United States’ departure from its longstanding commitment to free trade in an era increasingly shaped by trade wars and shifting geopolitical priorities. The article offers a critical analysis of how the world’s leading economy has turned to tariffs, unilateralism, and protectionist measures to reassert its global economic influence.
### I. Introduction
President Donald Trump’s imposition of sweeping tariffs—widely regarded as the most significant protectionist measures in over a century—marked a dramatic shift in United States (US) trade policy. Trump called it a “Liberation Day,” and the ensuing trade war disrupted global markets, erasing an estimated US$6.6 trillion in value within just 48 hours worldwide. A large portion of that loss was from US markets, but it’s not exclusive to the US. It represents a broader global market value loss tied to fears about disrupted trade, uncertainty, and slowed growth due to the trade war. In swift retaliation, China imposed reciprocal tariffs and blacklisted American firms, and tightened export controls on rare earth minerals essential to high-tech industries.
The US is effectively turning its back on a trading system that has long served it well. For nearly eighty years, the US has greatly benefited from trade liberalization. While it has consistently run a trade deficit in goods, it maintains a surplus in services—an area in which it is the world’s leading exporter.
By attempting to reduce the US trade deficit through broad tariffs—primarily targeting China and the European Union (EU)—Trump inadvertently strengthened the dollar by attracting global capital inflows.
Trump’s tariff strategy was unlikely to succeed for several reasons. Most importantly, his effort to “stop China” in key sectors such as technology failed to account for the complexities of highly integrated global supply chains. His belief that the US should maintain a bilateral trade balance with every country reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of global economics (Siddiqui, 2025). In today’s interconnected world, trade imbalances naturally arise from comparative advantage and specialization. By attempting to reduce the US trade deficit through broad tariffs—primarily targeting China and the European Union (EU)—Trump inadvertently strengthened the dollar by attracting global capital inflows. This, in turn, will make the US exports less competitive on the global stage (The Guardian, 2025a).
Moreover, true structural reform would require challenging the privileged status of the US dollar as the world’s primary reserve currency—a move that would undermine US financial hegemony (Siddiqui, 2024a). One probable objective of these tariffs was to force China and the EU into a currency revaluation similar to the 1985 Plaza Accord. That agreement led to a significant decline in Japanese exports and contributed to decades of economic stagnation. Yet, unlike 1980s Japan—a US ally with limited geopolitical leverage—China is neither defeated nor dependent. It is an ascendant power with growing influence. The contrast is underscored by the enduring US military presence in Okinawa, where over 53,000 American troops remain stationed, highlighting the historical asymmetry between the two cases.
Rather than adapting to an increasingly multipolar global order, the US appears committed to preserving its hegemonic status. In pursuit of this objective, it has employed a combination of strategic, economic, and diplomatic tools aimed at containing the rise of potential rivals—chiefly China—underscoring the geopolitical motivations behind its recent shift in trade policy (Siddiqui, 2020a).
There are indications that the US seeks to replicate the outcome it achieved with the Soviet Union: internal collapse driven by economic and systemic pressure. While the Soviet Union achieved significant technological and industrial advancements between the 1950s and 1970s, it ultimately failed to increase the production of consumer goods and improve living standards, contributing to its eventual disintegration in 1990. However, the analogy with China is limited. Unlike the Soviet Union, China has actively expanded its trade and investment ties, particularly within East Asia. Since its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, economic integration between China and its regional neighbors has deepened significantly, creating a resilient and dynamic network that distinguishes China’s position from that of the Soviet Union (Siddiqui, 2024b).
China is unlikely to agree to a significant revaluation of the renminbi (yuan) merely to address the US trade deficit. Trump’s twin objectives—reducing the trade deficit while preserving dollar hegemony—are, in fact, mutually exclusive. Protectionist measures alone are insufficient to correct structural imbalances in the economy. Without a broader overhaul of the international monetary and trading system, such policies are more likely to accelerate a shift away from US economic primacy than reinforce it (Siddiqui, 2020b).
Over the past eight decades, the trajectory of US trade policy has undergone dramatic shifts: from protectionism during the interwar period, to liberalization in the postwar era, and more recently, a return to protectionist tendencies. During the Great Depression, President Herbert Hoover of the United States signed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which increased average import duties by about 20% to protect domestic industries. However, this move resulted in retaliatory tariffs from major trading partners, causing significant disruptions in global commerce and worsening the global economic downturn.
In contrast, the post-World War II period marked a shift in US trade policy towards promoting open markets and reducing trade barriers. The US played a key role in establishing multilateral institutions like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO to facilitate trade liberalization. This approach benefited the US economy, as it produced over half of the world’s manufactured goods despite representing only 4% of the global population.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the US continued to lead the charge for globalization, capital mobility, and market integration. However, recent years have seen a resurgence of protectionist sentiment in the US in response to trade deficits, industrial decline, and income inequality. This shift comes at a time when many developing countries, particularly in East and Southeast Asia, have experienced rapid industrialization, with China emerging as a major player in technology and manufacturing.
The US has been a driving force behind globalization, aiming to maximize profits for multinational corporations. This led to the offshoring of production to lower-wage countries like China, resulting in cost savings for firms but also contributing to job losses and weakening labor unions in the US. Despite the benefits of globalization, recent tariffs imposed by President Donald Trump risk disrupting global trade systems and undermining economic benefits.
The current US strategy appears focused on disrupting China’s economic rise through punitive tariffs and restrictions on advanced technologies, as well as military posturing and support for dissident groups within China. This approach, exemplified by the recent trade war, aims to destabilize the global economy and reverse the momentum of globalization, but it poses risks and unintended consequences for all parties involved.
While tariffs may offer short-term protection for domestic industries, they can stifle innovation and productivity in the long run. The US’s shift towards protectionism contradicts its historical support for free trade and has negative implications for developing countries, which may face higher costs for American goods.
The US economy has undergone significant changes in recent decades, with a decline in manufacturing employment and a shift towards high-value sectors like finance, technology, and services. Manufacturing now accounts for a smaller percentage of GDP and employment compared to previous decades, reflecting broader structural shifts in the US economy. The importance of manufacturing in the economy has decreased compared to dominant sectors like services, healthcare, education, and finance. This shift has not only affected employment and output but has also impacted industrial capacity and supply chain sovereignty. The production of complex consumer electronics, for example, relies on components sourced from international supply chains, rather than being manufactured at scale within the US. The share of global manufacturing attributed to the US has declined sharply over time, with China emerging as the world’s largest manufacturer.
Moreover, in recent decades, US corporations have prioritized short-term shareholder value over long-term productivity and innovation, leading to a weakening of industrial competitiveness. Historically, protectionist policies have played a crucial role in the industrialization of now-developed countries, requiring comprehensive policy support beyond just tariffs. However, poorly conceived protectionist measures can lead to higher operational costs and reduced global competitiveness, ultimately impacting consumer prices and economic growth.
The US and China account for a significant portion of global trade, with trade as a percentage of GDP expanding over the past few decades. However, since the global financial crisis in 2008, there has been a decline in the share of trade relative to GDP, particularly in China. China’s response to the crisis involved adopting an inward-focused economic strategy, which included heavy investments in domestic infrastructure and services to stimulate internal markets and boost employment (World Bank, 2025; Dadush, 2022). This strategy aimed at reducing the country’s reliance on external trade and promoting self-sufficiency.
Trade between the US and China remained significant in 2024, with bilateral trade totaling US$582.4 billion. The US exported goods worth US$143.5 billion to China, while importing goods worth US$438.9 billion, resulting in a trade deficit of US$295.4 billion. This imbalance highlighted the differences in the economic profiles of the two countries, with the US focusing on agricultural and energy exports, while China dominated in the manufacturing sector.
China’s trade network has evolved since 2018, with a shift towards diversifying economic ties and focusing on partners from the Global South. East Asian countries now dominate China’s trading relationships, and the country has expanded cooperation with Russia and other BRICS nations. Under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has increased its exports to markets outside the US, reducing its reliance on the American market.
Despite these changes, certain product categories like electronics and raw materials crucial for manufacturing still heavily rely on access to the US market. China’s strategy of diversification combined with selective dependency aims to rebalance international trade relationships while maintaining competitive strengths in key sectors.
China’s efforts to bolster domestic production and diversify import partners have been evident in sectors like agriculture and pharmaceuticals. The country has also played a crucial role in supplying rare earth materials to the US, highlighting the interdependence between the two economies. Tariff impositions could disrupt supply chains and impact essential industries in both countries.
In conclusion, China’s evolving trade network, strategic economic interdependencies, and supply chain vulnerabilities underscore the complex nature of global trade relationships and the need for countries to adapt to changing economic landscapes. In recent times, there has been a simultaneous breakdown in both economic and geopolitical orders. The US has been exporting less to China compared to its imports from China, and this gap has been widening since China’s entry into the WTO in 2001. China has emerged as the ‘world’s factory’ by exporting products like electronics and machinery to the US market. President Trump has attempted to reverse this trend by imposing tariffs on Chinese imports. However, China has diversified its trade towards other emerging economies, reducing its dependence on the US market. This shift could lead to higher consumer prices, slower economic growth, and a potential recession in the US due to its escalating trade deficit with China post-2001. By 2024, China had reduced its exports to the US from 23% in 2018 to 13%.
Moreover, China has historically reinvested its export surpluses into US assets, particularly Treasury bonds, which have helped finance US fiscal deficits, support the dollar, and drive import growth. However, China has been reducing its holdings of US Treasurys in recent years, reallocating funds towards initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to strengthen global economic ties.
In conclusion, efforts to hinder China’s technological advancement have not been entirely successful. China has become a global leader in numerous critical technologies, driven by domestic innovation strategies like «Made in China 2025» and strong government support for companies like BYD and DeepSeek. Globalization has created integrated supply chains that rely on cost-effective international production, and imposing tariffs risks disrupting these networks, leading to increased costs and inefficiencies. Policymakers should consider economic decoupling from over-reliance on the US market and focus on strengthening trade cooperation and diversifying supply chains among major Global South economies to promote a more resilient and equitable global trading system. (1995) “The Myth of Free Trade”, The Nation, January 13.
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